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In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility 
decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses 
especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker 
(1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case d istorts 
decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the 
assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely 
responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is 
combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.   
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A.  Introduction 
All European pay-as-you-go systems (PAYGO) are on the verge of collapse. As birth rates 
decline and life-expectancies steadily rise the burden on the forthcoming generations 
reaches a level which is unsustainable for various reasons. Among economists it is, 
therefore, common sense that the dominance of unfunded systems has to be reduced by a 
larger share of funding. Yet, there is a lively debate in Germany as well as in other European 
countries about how pension entitlements should be capped. In general, two possibilities 
have been proposed: On the one hand one can lower entitlements equally for all members of 
a generation. This proposal is widespread among economists and was very recently 
advanced by a commission on the long-term sustainability of the German social-security 
system (Kommission zur Nachhaltigkeit der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme 
2003). On the other hand, a group of economists, recently Sinn (2000), proposes to 
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differentiate entitlements according to the generative contribution. Thus, the latter group aims 
at introducing a child-related pay-as-you-go pension system (CPAYGO) in which pensions 
are predominantly determined by the number of children.  
Even at first glance, the advantages of such a system seem to be compelling. First of all, a 
child-related pension system prevents a social dilemma which can occur in a traditional 
PAYGO. According to the social security hypothesis a PAYGO system diminishes fertility 
rates because of growing opportunity costs of children.
1 As costs have to be borne by 
parents but revenues (pensions) are distributed collectively, parents adjust their decisions 
and bear fewer children. This is inefficient as the pension system still relies on population 
growth.
2 This inefficiency can be overcome by granting pensions only to parents. Secondly, 
and this is an extension to the previous idea, a CPAYGO is stable even if the demography 
changes. In such a pension system those who do not have children are forced to save 
individually in order to secure their old-age income. Hence, as soon as fertility changes, e. g. 
because of changed preferences, individual savings will adjust. On a macroeconomic level 
the combination of human capital, here meant as future contribution payers, and real capital 
is always sufficient to secure a fixed level of pensions for the elder generation. 
In spite of these advantages the support for a CPAYGO is only minor. One major problem of 
this scheme is referred to as the quality-quantity trade-off. It is feared that a CPAYGO may 
negatively affect the quality of child-rearing, as Cigno (1993) and Folbre (1994) pointed out. 
With reference to Becker (1960) the quality of children involves investments in the well-being 
of children. Expenditures on the education or health care of children are the most prominent 
examples for those kinds of investments. As it is assumed that a higher level of quality will 
increase the probability of higher income and hence higher contributions to the pension 
system, a CPAYGO might cause a new social dilemma if quality is substituted by quantity (i. 
e. the number of children). Thus, a new inefficiency would occur. Besides, poverty and 
inequality might increase in future generations. 
This paper is aimed at examining this trade-off in greater detail. Using a simple 
microeconomic model in the tradition of Becker (1960) the decisions of a representative 
household concerning the quality and quantity of children under a traditional PAYGO and a 
CPAYGO are highlighted. Moreover, the analysis will be expanded by introducing a public 
education system. It will be demonstrated that the combination of such an institution and a 
CPAYGO is a means to restore optimality. Thus, these two institutions constitute a perfect 
marriage. Finally, the main conclusions are summarised.  
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B.  The Model 
The following microeconomic model highlights the effects on the quantity-quality decision of 
households under a PAYGO and a CPAYGO. There will be no attempt to close the model by 
introducing a production sector. Thus, the following ideas can be considered as partial 
analysis or as the decisions of a household in a small country where prices are fixed. 
We assume a representative household that lives for three periods (childhood, adulthood and 
retirement). Following the literature we restrict our analysis to two periods of life, adulthood 
and retirement, because children do not make economic decisions. The household derives 
utility from the consumption of goods and from the quantity and quality of children. Hence, 
the household is not altruistic towards its children but it regards children and their well-being 
(quality) as consumption goods.  
The utility function of the representative household is therefore defined as follows: 




t t t t q e c c U U + =             (1) 
where 
1 * + = t t t N e N                (2) 
1
t c
 : Consumption while working in period t 
2
1 + t c
 : Consumption while being retired in period t+1 
t e  : Number of children of the household 
t q  : Expenditures for the quality of children in period t 
t N : Size of generation t in period t 
The utility function U(·) is assumed to be strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-
concave. Thus, consumption, children and the quality of children are regarded as normal 
goods. The household receives a fixed labour income  t w
_
 in period t which it can use for 
raising and educating children, consumption and saving (st). The horizontal line above the 
variable for labour income indicates that the decision about its level was t aken by the 
previous generation. We assume that labour income depends on investments in quality 
received while being a child. This is a quite common expectation: The better children are 
educated and the healthier they stay, the greater should be their income prospects, at least 
on average. As a consequence of this structure the individual labour income is exogenous for 
the worker but endogenous for his offspring. We assume  ) ( 1 t t q w + to be twice differentiable   4 
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. Furthermore, the household faces a PAYGO system 
with a contribution rate of 0<a <1 and a promised pension of pt+1>0.   
The representative household, thus, maximises its utility function which is subject to the 
following restriction: 
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e
t z : Fixed cost per child, 
e
t z >0. 
 
q
t z : Price of one unit of quality, 
q
t z >0. 
   
In a first step we want to derive an optimal solution for the described decision problem. Such 
a solution could be regarded as the decision of an altruistic social planner with perfect 
foresight. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as the common maximisation of the utility of 
all individuals in the society.  In such an optimal solution it would be taken into account how a 
PAYGO system is financed. As it is common, the sum of contributions has to equal the sum 
of pensions in each period. Therefore, we obtain 
    1 1 1 * * ) ( * + + + = t t t t t N q w p N a             (5) 
Dividing (5) by Nt yields to 
    t t t t e q w p * * ) ( 1 1 a + + =             (6) 
Equation (6) clearly displays the well-known fact that the amount of payments a 
representative pensioner receives from a PAYGO system depends on her decisions while 
working. If households do not bear, rear and educate children, their pension entitlements 
have to be capped, provided that the contribution rate is fixed. Hence, as in a fully funded 
system, workers have to take precautions in order to receive a pension. Children and their 
quality are thus not only consumption but investment goods.  
If we now substitute (6) into (4), rearrange and optimise the utility function we receive the 
following results:   5 
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The term  l refers to the shadow price which is common in a Lagrangean. As we are 
especially interested in parental decisions concerning the number and quality of children, we 
can focus our analysis on equations (9) and (10). First of all, one should note that 
q
t z , et and 
qt appear in both equations. Hence, the chosen level of et directly affects the decision for qt, 
and vice versa. Such an outcome is typical for non-linear budget constraints and has an 
important effect on the considered quality and quantity decision. A shift of relative prices will 
most probably lead to more than proportional adjustments with respect to the chosen level of 
et and qt. Therefore, deviations from the optimal conditions can have enormous effects due to 
the interplay of these two variables.
3 Secondly, it becomes apparent that a social planner 
would take the costs as well as the revenues of children into account. Equation (9) displays 
the fact that in equilibrium the marginal utility of et has to equal the marginal costs per child, 
which consist of the fixed cost per child (
e
t z ) plus the quality cost per child ( t
q
t q z * ), minus 
the revenues per child, which are determined by the future contributions to the pension 
system per child ( ) 1 /( * ) ( 1 r q w t t + + a ). Of course, the revenues have to be discounted with 
the real interest rate (r>0) as they refer to the next period of life. The same logic applies to 
equation (10). The marginal costs of quality are determined by the number of children and 
the price per unit of quality ( t
q
t e z * ) whereas the marginal revenues of quality are constituted 
by the future extra contributions to the pension system that arise from an additional marginal 
expenditure on quality ( ) 1 /( * * / ) ( 1 r e q q w t t t t + ¶ ¶ + a ).  
Due to the interplay of quality and quantity decisions it is generally difficult to assess how a 
shift of r, a  or any other variable will affect the derived solution. However, for the following 
ideas it is sufficient to know the conditions for the optimal solution, not the solution itself. In 
the following we will examine how a representative household will adjust her decisions facing 
different types of PAYGO. As we know that in each PAYGO, either a traditional or a child-
related system, pensions have to be financed by the contribution payments of future 
generations, the just derived optimal conditions must hold in order to guarantee efficiency.   
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C.  PAYGO vs. CPAYGO  
Bearing this in mind we now want to examine the decisions of a representative household. 
For an individual, pt+1 is not endogenous but exogenous because her individual decision does 
not seem to affect the financial situation of the PAYGO. Especially in large societies which 
consist of many households, the individual generative contribution seems to become less 
important (for the pension). Thus, revenues that correspond to bearing and raising children 
vanish and the pension entitlement becomes a benefit which from the point of view of an 
individual household cannot be influenced. If this is the case the first-order conditions for U(
.) 
with respect to et and qt change as follows:    
) * ( * /
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It is obvious that due to higher opportunity costs of children (i.e. less revenues) the 
household chooses a lower level of both et and qt. When pensions are perceived as fixed the 
future contributions of children to the PAYGO system are ignored. Hence, the investment 
motive for raising children vanishes, probably with severe consequences for the sustainability 
of the pension system. Concerning the marginal rate of substitution, which can be easily 
derived if we divide (11) and (12), the direction of change is difficult to assess as we have not 
specified  w t+1(qt). For the sake of simplicity we assume that the substitution rate remains 
constant so that the following equation must hold:  

























1           (13) 
However, even different assumptions would not lead to other results. If the substitution rate 
remains unchanged, et  and q t will be r educed equally. This reduction, in turn, will affect 
equation (6). If a is fixed, pension entitlements have to be lower compared to the optimal 
situation. In addition, if fertility and expenditures on quality fall below a certain level, the sum 
of wages constantly decreases leading to further and further pension cuts.
4 Of course, this 
effect could be compensated by private funding. Yet, this is not efficient as welfare could be 
increased if decisions about the number and quality of children are revised. Furthermore, in 
most countries a is not fixed but pt+1. Possibly because of a guaranteed minimum pension or 
because of preferences of the median voter (Browning 1975), the contribution rate a  will be 
adjusted in order to finance the promised amount of pensions. Then the disposable income 
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of forthcoming households will decline which reduces overall consumption including less 
children and less expenditures on quality. As a result, a vicious circle develops which makes 
all forthcoming generations worse off.  
No matter if a or pt+1 is affected, the situation can be regarded as a social dilemma. As costs 
of children have to be borne individually but revenues are distributed collectively, individual 
costs of children are higher than social costs. Therefore, decisions are suboptimal and there 
are possibilities for improvement. Of course, if all individuals could bargain in this situation 
efficiency could be restored, but that solution can be excluded because of transaction costs 
and a lack of commitment as one can easily comprehend. So a different solution is needed to 
overcome this problem of institutional externalities
5. 
Two possibilities have been advanced. Firstly, the PAYGO system could be abandoned (see 
for example Feldstein (1996) for this proposal).  Secondly, efficiency could be restored by 
redefining property rights. The first solution is very popular among economists. However, a 
transition to a fully funded system is difficult to design as the entitlements of the elder 
generations have to be preserved. Therefore, the current workers have to cope with a double 
burden which most possibly hampers welfare improvements. In addition and regardless of 
the double burden, a PAYGO system itself can be a device to reach efficiency. For instance, 
Radka and Razin (1995) show that, in absence of negative bequests, such an 
intergenerational transfer system is efficient. Furthermore, the mixture of human capital and 
real capital might be a more efficient way to secure old age pensions with reference to the 
portfolio selection theory (see Merton 1984). Moreover, in most western European countries 
policy makers discuss only a freezing of contribution rates which leads to a diminished size 
of the PAYGO but not its abolition. This also applies to current proposals in Germany as it 
was mentioned in the introduction. Hence, the social dilemma will still exist, only the 
magnitude of the problem is reduced.  
Having outlined these arguments shall be sufficient to explain why we are more interested in 
the second alternative which is referred to as a child-related pay-as-you-go system 
(CPAYGO). By differentiating pensions according to the number of children such a system is 
aimed at merging social and individual costs of child bearing. Alternatively, one could say 
that the property rights with regard to contributions of the working generation are re-defined, 
i.e. according to the involvement in bearing and educating children. 
We assume that the representative household receives a pension bt+1 per child. Initially, the 
total amount of pensions shall not change so that the following equation holds: 
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Then, the budget constraint for second period consumption changes as follows: 
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By optimising (1) with respect to (3) and (15) we obtain the following results for et and qt: 
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It is directly obvious that the introduction of a CPAYGO has the same effect as a price –
reduction of the fixed costs (
e
t z ) per child. Therefore, relative prices will change. As the fixed 
price per child solely affects the demand for children and not the demand for quality, the 
direction of change is straightforward. The household will choose more children but will 
invest less in their quality. Depending on the substitution elasticity this effect might be 
significant due to the non-linearity of the budget constraint. Most probably, the effect will be 
more than proportional. In either case, however, the demand for both, quality and quantity, 
remains positive because they are normal goods. 
Nonetheless, this result confirms the point of view of Cigno (1993) and Folbre (1994). A 
CPAYGO induces a substitution effect which cannot restore efficiency. Comparing equations 
(9) and (10) with (16) and (17) we can conclude that the household takes into account the 
future revenues per child (bt+1), but not the marginal revenues of expenditures on quality. As 
the determinants of future contributions are not considered simultaneously, this pension 
scheme is not adequate to allow for efficiency. 
However, it is not clear at all whether the alternative, a traditional PAYGO, is preferable. The 
introduction of either pay-as-you-go system involves inefficiencies. While a traditional 
PAYGO system makes all future individuals worse off because of increasing contribution 
rates or decreasing pension entitlements, a CPAYGO distorts fertility choices and negatively 
affects the consumption possibilities of future generations due to lower expenditures on 
quality investments. Therefore, the overall effect is difficult to judge. Concerning the financial 
basis of the pension system the effect is ambiguous, too. Presumably the increase in the 
reproduction rate will offset the quality-related reduction of wages so that the transfers to the 
elder generation increase but that shall not be examined further. Instead, we want to discuss 
whether there are ways to prevent this inefficiency. More precisely, we examine if the 
inefficient substitution effect can be offset by the introduction of a second device. Fortunately, 
it turns out that an appropriate institutional framework is already in place: A public education   9 
system. 
D.  The role of public education 
So far we have implicitly assumed that only parents finance expenditures that are related to 
the quality of children. Yet this is not the case. In almost all modern societies benefits for 
families are widespread, especially concerning education, health care and child care. For 
Germany, the advisory council of  the  Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth ( Wissenschaftlicher Beirat  für Familienfragen 2002)  
asserts that approximately between 20.8 % and 35.8 % of total expenditures on children 
(except for opportunity costs) are borne by taxpayers. Similar results apply to the majority of 
European countries. 
Predominantly these benefits aim to improve the well-being of children, hence their quality. 
As a consequence, transfers in kind outweigh transfers in cash by far. As we will see, such 
measurements affect the favourability of both pay-as-you-go systems in question 
considerably.  In the following we restrict our analysis to a public education system as an 
example for such public expenditures. At least three different reasons can be advanced for 
this restriction. Firstly, public education is common in almost all countries and therefore the 
most prominent example for public expenditures related to children. Secondly, it is without 
question that these expenditures directly affect the quality decisions taken by parents. Other 
benefits, like subsidies for child care (kindergarten), might have other goals depending on the 
circumstances. For example, publicly financed child care could be regarded as a means to 
enhance women’s employment because it reduces the opportunity costs per child. Thirdly 
and finally, the rationale for public education is beyond dispute while other means of 
collective investment in the quality of children, like free health care, are more often 
questioned.
6 As education involves an externality problem itself a corresponding transfer is a 
means to enhance economic efficiency. Furthermore, public education is the major device to 
improve equal opportunities. As Homann and Pies (1996) put it, it guarantees the approval of 
a social contract. Behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, thus, individuals would most probably 
settle for such an institution. In spite of our focus on public education it should be stressed 
that the analysis could be applied to other types of benefits  as well. Then, however, we 
would have to discuss guidelines for a rational family policy which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
In a first step we want to examine the effect of the introduction of public education while a 
traditional PAYGO system is in place. From a historical perspective this can be regarded as 
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a typical development. We assume that a share t of all costs related to the education of 
children is publicly financed. This can denote that parents still have to pay a fee per child 
towards the school or that additional services have to be borne individually. The provision of 
the public good shall be financed by an income tax t. Thus, we gain the following condition: 
t t
q
t w t q z * * * = t               (18) 
Due to the introduction of public education the optimisation problem of the household with 
respect to the first period changes as follows: 
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If we now rearrange and optimise (1) with respect to (19) and (4), we can derive the marginal 
rate of substitution of et with respect to qt: 
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As the sign of this expression is positive we can conclude that quantity is substituted by 
quality of children. Hence, the more costs a society bears that refer to the quality of children 
the fewer children will be born. As the price for one unit of quality decreases (because of t) 
households adjust their plans and spend more income on quality investments which directly 
decrease the demand for the number of children. Due to the changes in the institutional 
framework it becomes more attractive for households to raise fewer but better educated 
children. In addition, this substitution effect will be backed by the introduction of an income 
tax.  
With reference to our optimal solution the reproduction rate is far too low. Remember that the 
introduction of a PAYGO already leads to a suboptimal choice regarding fertility. By adding a 
system of public education this problem worsens because relative prices are distorted. 
Likewise the financial stability of the PAYGO deteriorates because the basis of contribution 
payments erodes. Although income prospects rise due to the increase in quality investments, 
the reduction in fertility most probably outweighs this effect and, therefore, harms the 
sustainability of unfunded pension systems even further. Against this background it is not 
surprising that especially countries which focus on granting benefits to families that aim at 
improving the well-being of children, like Germany, Italy or Spain, have lower fertility rates 
than those countries who aim to lower costs for both quantity and quality, like France (see 
Eurostat 2003).    11 
So far we can conclude that a pure CPAYGO distorts decisions in favour of the number of 
children while a traditional PAYGO in combination with public education distorts decisions in 
favour of expenditures on quality. It is, therefore, self-evident to examine whether these 
cases of sub-optimality can be overcome by settling for both, a system of public education 
and a child-related pension system. 
In order to do so, we combine equations (19) and (15). Hence, there are now two devices, 
bt+1 and t, which differently affect the quantity and quality decisions of the household. For the 
corresponding optimisation problem we gain the following solutions: 
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Now we are able to restore optimality as one can act on both conditions simultaneously. By 
equating (21) and (8) as well as (22) and (9) and solving for bt+1  we gain the optimal level for 
the child-related pension. 
    t
t
t t
t t t q
q
q w
q w b *
) (






+ + a a           (22) 
This result needs a brief explanation. The first term on the right-hand side refers to the total 
sum of contributions a worker pays for the elder generation. It represents, therefore, the 
maximum pension which an adult could receive per child. This sum of contributions has to be 
diminished by the second term.  The derivation of w t+1(qt) with respect to q t allegorises the 
rate of return of expenditures on quality.  Thus, the last term has to be regarded as the total 
amount of revenues that were achieved by expenditures on the quality of children. Of course, 
these revenues have to be multiplied with  a as only this share of revenues is distributed 
among the pensioners. As a result, pension entitlements should not only be granted 
according to the number of children raised because expenditures on quality have to be 
rewarded, too.   
For t we obtain the following condition: 















+ a t             (23) 
Substituting t in (18) and rearranging we can identify the second motive for obtaining a 
pension in such an optimal CPAYGO. 
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In equilibrium the sum of taxes equals the sum of revenues which correspond to t he 
expenditures on the quality of children. As the term on the left refers to period one and the 
term on the right hand side to period two, the sum of revenues has to be discounted.  
The significance of (24) is as follows. Taxpayers gain pension entitlements by investing in the 
quality of children. Therefore, we obtain a rationale for granting childless households a 
pension, too. One might ask why individual expenditures on the quality of children are not 
rewarded in optimum. However, if  t is chosen correctly investment and consumption with 
respect to  q are separated from each other. The share  t of costs represents those 
expenditures which are aimed to secure old age pensions while the share (1-t) refers to 
consumption by parents. Likewise one might say that the social and individual costs of 
quality are brought together by subsidising the price per unit of quality. 
Bearing this in mind the assessment of the substitution effect has to be revised. It is obvious 
that a substitution effect will occur if a society which subsidises public education converts a 
traditional PAYGO system into a CPAYGO. In this case, however, the substitution effect is 
inevitable in order to enhance welfare. One might argue that due to this effect income 
prospects of future generations deteriorate because of lower expenditures on quality. Yet this 
must not be the case. As contribution rates could be lowered the amount of disposable 
income will increase leading to additional expenditures on the quality of children. 
Furthermore, one should keep in mind that especially during the last decades the opportunity 
costs per child have increased dramatically as income prospects of women have been rising. 
Therefore, one should not expect a far higher reproduction rate due to a child-related 
pension.   
At this point of the discussion one could ask whether it would be more useful to grant the 
child-related pension while parents actually raise children. For instance, liquidity constraints 
of parents could back the preference for child allowances.  Although this discussion shall not 
be the topic of this paper at least two arguments can be put forward for restricting the benefit 
to the retirement age. First, in the real world the average future income of children, and thus 
the average contribution, is difficult to estimate. Hence, it is even more difficult to achieve 
optimality. Nevertheless, this would not be the main cause. Second and more important, 
even with a CPAYGO in place the dominance of unfunded pension systems has to be 
reduced. When child related pensions are paid out while parents are young they will solely 
receive a pension that corresponds to investments in the quality of children. As a 
consequence, the replacement rate would be relatively low so that a pension above the 
minimum living standard could not be guaranteed. Then even parents have to be obliged to 
save individually in order to prevent free-riding. As one can see, the child-related pension 
entitlement disburdens parents from mandatory saving which in turn has the same effect as   13 
an additional transfer while being young. To sum up, only when the minimum standard of 
living is guaranteed an untimely provision of the child-related pension is an option. For 
instance, one could allow parents with more than two children to opt for a child allowance for 
each additional child instead of an additional pension entitlement. 
E.  Outlook 
This paper dealt with the interplay of fertility decisions and different types of pay-as-you-go 
systems. Thereby, especially the possibility of undesirable substitution effects accompanying 
the introduction of a CPAYGO has been examined. As it turned out, a substitution effect is 
inevitable but optimal provided that a public education system is in place. By acting 
simultaneously on both  variables, quantity and quality of c hildren, inefficiency can be 
prevented. Therefore, these two institutions ideally supplement each other so that they can 
be called a perfect marriage. In addition, one major objection against the introduction of a 
CPAYGO, the fear of an undesirable substitution effect, can be rejected. 
Of course, further research, theoretical as well as empirical, would be beneficial. The 
presented model could be extended in many directions. It would be possible, for example, to 
introduce bequests into the model without changing the essence of the model. Furthermore, 
more types of pension systems or a different institutional framework could be considered. On 
the empirical side, the return on expenditures on quality should be estimated in order to grant 
pensions adequately.  
For forthcoming pension reforms the presented result is, nonetheless, really promising. In 
most western countries a system of public education is in place so that the transition of the 
PAYGO system into a CPAYGO is welfare enhancing. In addition, the odds for such a reform 
are favourable as pension entitlements have to be only partly related to the number of 
children. Therefore, the transition process is much easier to implement. By combining the 
CPAYGO with private saving, countries will obtain a pension system that is sustainable and 
independent of demographic developments. As the peak of demographic crisis is already in 
sight the first step towards a new pension system should be made right now.  
      14 
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